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Abstract—Despite the Internet being an apex of human
achievement for many years, malicious activity and cyber attacks
are becoming more prevalent than ever before. Large scale data
collection using threat sources such as honeypots have recently
been employed to gather information relating to these attacks.
While this data naturally details attack properties, there exists
challenges in extracting the relevant information from vast data
sets to provide valuable insight and a standard description of
the attack. Traditionally, threats are identified through the use
of signatures that are crafted manually through the composition
of IOCs (Indicators of Compromise) extracted from telemetry
captured during an attack process, which is often administered
by an experienced engineer. These signatures have been proven
effective in their use by IDSs (Intrusion Detection Systems) to
detect emerging threats. However, little research has been made in
automating the extraction of emerging IOCs and the generation
of corresponding signatures which incorporate host artefacts. In
this paper we present Citrus: a novel approach to the generation
of signatures by incorporating host based telemetry extracted
from honeypot endpoints. Leveraging this visibility at an endpoint
grants a detailed understanding of bleeding edge attack tactics,
techniques, and procedures gathered from host logs.
Index Terms—honeypot, threat intelligence, signature genera-
tion
I. INTRODUCTION
The evolving threat landscape is a back and forth battle
between malware authors incorporating innovative methods
of infection and systems administrators repelling attacks by
improving their detection systems. The defense mechanism
of choice within enterprise network is usually an IDS, which
typically performs pattern matching of behaviour observed
inside the local network in comparison to known malicious
signatures. Consequently, the effectiveness of an IDS is dic-
tated by the accuracy of the signatures within its database.
This method requires periodic signature updates in order to
keep abreast of emerging threats.
Honeypots are systems under observation which contain
components that masquerade as legitimate enterprise infras-
tructure in order to catch unsuspecting adversaries leveraging
previously unobserved exploits, attack tactics and patterns
used for infiltration [1]. Utilising these honeypots grants unre-
stricted access to emerging threat log data, which is otherwise
extremely difficult for the wider community to access due to
corporations limiting the exposure of breaches. The benefits
of this approach relate to the fact that activity relating to
these systems is extremely likely to be malicious as all
communication is unsolicited. Therefore, data garnered from
honeypots offers an invaluable source of signatures which can
be utilised by an IDS to provide detection against emerging
threats.
Recent literature [2]–[5] has identified the benefits of ex-
tracting attack characteristics from honeypots and generating
signatures such that attacks in the same vein are prevented.
While providing effective signatures for NIDSs (Network In-
trusion Systems), this research does not consider events which
transpire at a host level, and only provides signatures suitable
for network based defense mechanisms. Gaining visibility at
a host level when uncovering stages within an attack grants a
greater understanding of malware behaviour and provides mul-
tiple IOCs which capture malicious authentication, registry,
and process operations [6], which would otherwise be omitted
if using traditional network telemetry, thus enabling each stage
within an attack to be detailed and available to an IDS. The
proposed approach in this work orchestrates the retrieval of
emerging threat data from myriad sources to a centralised
storage platform, where the data is then processed, analysed,
and contextualised through requests to external services in
order to craft malicious behavioural signatures which provide
rapid defense measures of the latest attacks from a host
perspective. In this paper, we present the design and imple-
mentation of Citrus, a novel honeypot signature generation
framework which enables the identification and prevention
of emerging threats by considering behavioural operations at
a host level. The detection capabilities Citrus provides are
discussed in the Evaluation section. This is achieved by Citrus
orchestrating the subscription and digestion of information
from a variety of sources and applying generated signature
rules to a policy engine which prevents bleeding edge attacks
causing compromise within the internal network.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Threat Intelligence
Threat Intelligence refers to the behaviour and information
derived from observation of threat sources. Research into this
sphere attempts to extract IOCs to gain an understanding
of attack properties so attacks of the same type can be
prevented. In contemporary literature, this is often achieved
by an evaluation of network activity initiated by malware.
Vasilomanolakis et al. [5] used bespoke ICS (Industrial Control
System) honeypots in order to generate signatures of multi
stage attacks by modeling each disparate protocol from the
same host as a separate stage in the attack. For each of these
stages, a signature is generated based upon characteristics of
the network packet involved in the attack which is then used
by Bro IDS1 to evaluate the detection capabilities. However,
this approach lacks an understanding of activity from a host
perspective. In order to tackle the most sophisticated threats,
defenses which incorporate both host and network telemetry
detection mechanisms have been proposed to provide greater
accuracy and visibility [7]. To the best of our knowledge,
there has been no research which generates and implements
defense signatures via host activity garnered from a honeypot.
For the purposes of integration into industry standard defense
mechanisms, the generated host based signatures should be
easily understandable, accessible and translatable to bespoke
IDS and SIEM (Security Information and Event Management)
search terms. Sigma2, a generic signature format to describe
log events, was chosen for this purpose. Sigma’s utility is
based upon its open and universal event description so that
defense mechanisms which incorporate a host based under-
standing are able to compare internal behaviour to known
malicious signatures. The focus of Citrus is the generation
of host signatures based on event logs extracted from medium
and high interaction honeypots as well as behavioural analysis
of malware extracted from sandbox services.
B. Honeypot
Honeypots are systems emulating production service with
the intention to attract adversaries who wish to infiltrate infras-
tructure. These type of systems can be loosely classified into
two distinct types: medium-interaction and high-interaction.
Medium-interaction honeypots aim to masquerade as a realis-
tic service such as Telnet and provide an underlying emulated
environment which allow attackers to further interact and
capture exploits without them being successful in infiltration.
High-interaction honeypots further add complexity as they
deploy real operating systems and applications in which an
attacker has the ability to completely gain access. While the
risk of infiltration is much greater, the data gathered via logs
allows a richer understanding of the extent of their behaviour.
The nature of honeypots allow observation of developing
attack mechanisms which yield a wealth of detailed log
information. In order for these systems to become useful in
a production environment, these logs must be analysed to
uncover specific characteristics of the attack. This is often
undertaken by a network engineer who can interpret the
results and administer policies to remedy the threat. In recent
times, Elasticsearch3 has proved a popular approach for the
purpose of threat hunting [8], [10]. This approach enables a
scalable environment in which search queries are utilised to




providing the means for rapid visualisation and attribution
of threat behaviour across distributed data sets, this process
relies heavily on expert analysis by a human actor which
remains a slow and tedious process [2], [3]. Furthermore,
implementation of prevention mechanisms is also a manual
process in which the data mined characteristics of the attacks
are used by systems such as a firewall. This is not suitable
in cases of time-critical importance, where any delay in the
implementation of mechanisms may allow unauthorised access
to corporate assets. Hence the need for automated routines
which digest this data and provide response in the form of
accurate security measures [10].
Fig. 1. Architecture overview of Citrus and its components
III. DESIGN
The aim of Citrus is to bolster existing IDS by providing
an automated framework in which host based signatures of
emerging attacks are generated. The architecture of Citrus is
outlined in Figure 1. As depicted, the Tangerine module is
responsible for the analysis of information derived from intel-
ligence feeds. This process first digests data from the deployed
low and medium interaction honeypots, then normalises this
into a common format, and gathers further context about the
attack via queries to external sources. The dynamic run time
behaviour of executed malware is captured for entry into the
policy engine so that internal hosts displaying signs of similar
behaviour are rapidly identified. The Mandarin module within
Citrus is responsible for the collection and processing of data
emanating from the selection of high interaction honeypots.
In the same ilk, Clementine orchestrates the retrieval of host
log data from internal network hosts for correlation and
comparison to signatures generated by Citrus.
Gaining insight into the methodology of malicious actors
allows greater understanding of the way in which to detect
them [8]. A number of honeypots have been deployed for this
purpose within a research facility, the Cyber Threat Labora-
tory, located inside Lancaster University. These honeypots vary
in the level of interaction and placement within the network
topology in order to capture a range of potentially interesting
malicious activity. For example, deployment within a local
network limits the scope of people able to interact with in-
ternal hosts. The plurality of these systems require centralised
logging infrastructure capable of correlation between vast data
sets. For this purpose, Citrus contains an intelligence module
instrumented to subscribe to published honeypots and collate
their telemetry data for further analysis and correlation.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
A. Intelligence Orchestration
Citrus generates Sigma signatures from behaviour observed
on high and medium interaction honeypots. In order to gen-
erate these signatures, logs describing mechanisms of at-
tacks must be digested and analysed. Citrus achieves this
by subscribing to a Kafka4 broker where streams of events
from the honeypots are stored. As well as receiving raw log
inputs, Citrus also maintains a record of malware dropped
onto the medium interaction honeypots. If a malware variant
has not previously been encountered by Citrus, the hash is
calculated and stored. Citrus also orchestrates the correlation
with external sources, such as VirusTotal, autonomously in
order to generate a rich understanding of malware behaviour.
VirusTotal5 is a malware intelligence service which provides
a wealth of information pertaining to malicious files such as
target operating system and malware family, and in some cases
rich runtime behaviour which relates to the implementation
detail [9]. In the event that a log is transferred from a
honeypot to Citrus, it must be initially ensured that the event
which the log describes is malicious. This is achieved by
modelling normal behaviour on the honeypots, and any event
which deviates from this pattern is deemed malicious and a
corresponding signature is generated.
B. Honeypot Processing & Signature Generation
As discussed in the previous sections, there is a need for
host based signatures of emerging threats. Utilising Sigma as
the method of describing the malicious actions occurring on
the deployed honeypots grants a rich understanding of attacks
suitable for detection using heterogeneous defense solutions.
Citrus receives logs from disparate sources such as Windows
Event Tracing and honeypots such as Dionaea, and converts
the extracted malicious events into Sigma format for inclusion
into IDSs signature database. Citrus orchestrates the generation
of Sigma signatures upon notification by the Tangerine module
that a malicious action was taken on a honeypot. Citrus is
capable of generating signatures which describe a range of
malicious mechanisms including file creation and modifica-
tion, process creation, registry activity, service creation, and
authentication. By specifying which mechanism is used in the
attack, the details which uniquely identify it are extracted from
raw event log data and translated into Sigma format using a
template signature file. An example signature is documented
in Listing 1, and describes the series of process creation
4Kafka https://kafka.apache.org
5VirusToal https://www.virustotal.com













Listing 1. Process creation signature of WannaCry variant
C. Policy Engine Integration
Sigma provides a standard signature format to describe
events from log sources. It is intended to be flexible in
nature and will seamlessly integrate with any IDS, SIEM,
or bespoke security framework. To show the feasibility of
this integration and the detection capabilities provided, Citrus
was instrumented with a bespoke policy engine which uses
the Sigma format. Furthermore, a detection application was
built upon Citrus which performs a comparison of each log
emanating from internal hosts to signatures present within the
policy engine. If a known signature matches with any log,
Citrus detects an intrusion and an alert is issued.
V. EVALUATION
In order to evaluate Citrus, a relevant network test-bed was
developed and is outlined below. For the purposes of hunting
for emerging threats a Debian VM (Virtual Machine) contain-
ing TPot6 was deployed within the Cyber Threat Laboratory.
The VM was granted an externally accessible WAN (Wide
Area Network) IP address in order to capture a wide variety
of potential attacks including credential bruteforcing, exploit
observation and malware capture over a large surface area.
TPot is composed of a number of medium interaction container
based honeypots enabling multiple vulnerable services to be
exposed to the internet. High interaction honeypots were
deployed which are based on Windows Docker containers.
Individual attacks are allowed to propagate fully and complete
their objective in order to capture the entire attack session and
its corresponding events. Once this has been accomplished,
the Docker containers are destroyed and reprovisioned, ready
for another adversary to attempt infiltration. The intricately de-
tailed host and networking logs from high interaction honeypot
and emerging threat data extracted from medium interaction
honeypots are transferred to Citrus in the same manner: Kafka.
A Kafka broker was instantiated which receives a stream
of events from the honeypots. Citrus maintains a constant
connection to this Kafka broker to receive updates about threat




In this evaluation, malware dropped onto medium interac-
tion honeypots and Windows Event logs from high interaction
honeypots are used for signature generation purposes. As Cit-
rus maintains an authoritative record of files dropped onto the
medium interaction honeypots, Sigma signatures are generated
based upon the hash of the file and also the dynamic run time
behaviour gathered from external sources. As the hash value is
trivially changed via minute code modification, Citrus attempts
to extract behavioural artefacts which are unlikely to change
upon recompilation to defend against similar variants.
The hash and file behaviour of a PE file obtained through an
exploit captured on the Dionaea honeypot is used to evaluate
the efficiency of policy application. The time taken for the
generation of the signature is illustrated in Figure 2. During
the period of observation, a number of distinct attacks were
captured on the high interaction honeypots, their attack mech-
anisms were recorded and the corresponding signatures were
generated. To evaluate the efficiency of signature generation
based on event logs extracted from high interaction honeypot,
the time taken within each stage of the process was calculated
and is also shown in Figure 2.
B. Detection Capabilities
The first aspect to evaluate the effectiveness of the sig-
natures generated by Citrus involves ensuring the signatures
are specific enough to not generate false positive detection.
To test this hypothesis, attacks were injected into the high
interaction honeypots Citrus governs. These attacks involve
remote authentication and execution of malware which gen-
erate Windows Event logs, which are in turn received by
Citrus where signatures are generated and the corresponding
logs are stored for future playback. This test utilises publicly
available dataset of host logs [11] in order to determine the
effectiveness of the signatures. The signatures generated in
the previous stage were imported into Citrus’ policy engine
and the dataset was replayed by sending each log to the
collector module. As expected, no alerts were issued by Citrus
when processing the benign dataset. To further test that the
signatures generated are accurate enough to successfully detect
the attacks, the corresponding logs which represent the attacks
in the previous stage were subsequently merged with the
dataset and replayed to Citrus. Each of the injected attacks
were correctly identified by the detection application within
Citrus without false positive assessment.
VI. FUTURE WORK
The successful identification of attacks suggest this avenue
is worth exploring further to exploit the defense benefits
encompassing host based honeypot signatures. In our eval-
uation, primitive attacks were used to detect the evaluate
the detection capabilites. It would be valuable to incorporate
sophisticated attacks which leverage multiple stages, such as
lateral movement, to extensively test the intricate host details
available to Citrus, and the corresponding accuracy of the
signatures.
Fig. 2. Time taken for signature generation of attack mechanism
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presents the design, implementation, and evalu-
ation of a honeypot signature generation framework, Citrus,
which is adept at observation and mitigation of emerging
threats by the analysis of data collected from honeypots of
varying interaction levels. The work outlined in this paper
showcases the accuracy of the detection capabilities, and the
flexibility to integrate these signatures to support existing IDS
via the open event description format, Sigma.
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